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S H O R T A R T I C L E
Decomposing Public Opinion Variation into Ideology,
Idiosyncrasy, and Instability
Benjamin E. Lauderdale, London School of Economics and Political Science
Chris Hanretty, Royal Holloway, University of London
Nick Vivyan, Durham University
We propose a method for decomposing variation in the issue preferences that US citizens express on surveys into three
sources of variability that correspond to major threads in public opinion research. We ﬁnd that, averaging across a set of
high-proﬁle US political issues, a single ideological dimension accounts for about 1/7 of opinion variation, individuals’
idiosyncratic preferences account for about 3/7, and response instability for the remaining 3/7. These shares vary sub-
stantially across issue types, and the average share attributable to ideology doubles when a second ideological dimension is
permitted. We also ﬁnd that (unidimensional) ideology accounts for almost twice as much response variation (and re-
sponse instability is substantially lower) among respondents with high, rather than low, political knowledge. Our esti-
mation strategy is based on an ordinal probit model with random effects and is applicable to other data sets that include
repeated measurements of ordinal issue position data.
S ince Converse (1964) political scientists have debatedthe extent to which citizens have organized preferencesabout political issues or indeed whether they have such
preferences at all (Achen 1975; Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feld-
man 1992). In this short article, we exploit recent survey data
collected by Broockman (2016) to decompose variation in
citizens’ expressed issue preferences into three sources of
variability. First, how much is ideological, by which we mean
predictable from a citizen’s preferences on other issues given
the way preferences are typically organized in the population?1
Second, how much is idiosyncratic, by which we mean pref-
erences that are not predictable from a citizen’s preferences on
other issues but that are nonetheless stable in repeated mea-
surement? Third, how much is instability, by which we mean
preference variation that is not stable in repeatedmeasurement
and that combines measurement error and nonattitudinal
response behaviors? Although scholars have at various points
argued for the relative importance of each of these sources
of variability in opinion, to our knowledge none have provided
a quantitative summary of how much variation is attributable
to each one.
CONTEXT
There is a long-running debate within political science about
the extent to which most citizens have “reasonably well-
formed attitudes on major political issues” (Zaller and Feld-
man 1992, 579) that exist independently of the survey in-
struments designed to measure such attitudes. On one view,
survey respondents may be perfectly capable of responding
to questions designed to elicit political preferences, but these
responses merely reﬂect the result of a sample of consider-
ations bearing on the matter, which are context biased in ways
that lead them to give different answers at different points in
time (579). Evidence in favor of this view comes from the low
Benjamin E. Lauderdale (b.e.lauderdale@lse.ac.uk) is an associate professor in the Department of Methodology at the London School of Economics and
Political Science, London, UK. Chris Hanretty (Chris.Hanretty@rhul.ac.uk) is a professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Royal
Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK. Nick Vivyan (nick.vivyan@durham.ac.uk) is an associate professor in the School of Government and
International Affairs at Durham University, Durham, UK.
Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu
/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/695673.
1. This is a thin deﬁnition of ideology—what Converse refers to as constraint.
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correlation between many measures of attitudes at different
points in time, from open-ended survey questions eliciting
voter considerations, and from the extensive literature on prim-
ing. Against this evidence, it has been argued that low over-time
correlation is an indication that survey responses are subject to
large measurement error such that stable underlying attitudes
can result in volatile survey responses (Achen 1975) and that
many priming effects are better understood as information ef-
fects (Lenz 2009).
If citizens do not have stable preferences on major po-
litical issues at all, then there is no point arguing about
whether those attitudes can be effectively summarized by a
position in some latent ideological space. However, if po-
litical preferences are at least partially stable or real, then
they may or may not have a low dimensional structure
(ideology) that explains much of the variation in preferences
across different issues. There is disagreement about whether
preferences can be represented using just one left-right di-
mension (Jacoby 1995; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009) or
whether they must instead be represented using two dimen-
sions (Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Evans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996;
Feldman and Johnston 2014). The more that preferences can
be represented in terms of a small number of underlying di-
mensions, the less role there is for idiosyncratic preferences,
understood as “nonideological” preferences that cannot be
predicted on the basis of preferences about other issues but
that are nonetheless real, stable views about particular issues
(Broockman 2016).
This article argues that we can usefully understand these
two debates—about the extent to which preferences are real
and about the extent to which they are ideological—as part
of a larger question about the composition of survey re-
sponse variation. Our decomposition of preferences into
components corresponding to ideology, idiosyncrasy, and
instability can be mapped onto these previous debates. The
debate over whether preferences are real is a debate about the
relative contribution of ideology plus idiosyncrasy versus
instability. The debate over whether preferences are ideo-
logical is a debate about the relative contribution of ideology
versus idiosyncrasy (either with or without instability).
In our reading, no one has directly assessed the three-way
decomposition quantitatively. Converse (1964) evaluates both
the correlation structure across issues as well as the stability of
responses within issues, but the synthesis of the evidence
from those analyses is qualitative. Subsequent studies, in-
cluding the Broockman study whose data we reanalyze, have
similarly done a series of analyses and then summarized the
results qualitatively. The costs of a purely qualitative syn-
thesis of the evidence are apparent in the subsequent multi-
decade debate spurred by Converse’s study, a debate that
tended to get simpliﬁed into binary questions about whether
preferences were real or not, or ideological or not, rather than
decompositional questions about how much of observed
preference variation is real and how much is ideological
(Converse 2000; Feldman 2013).
DATA
To quantitatively decompose response variation into ideol-
ogy, idiosyncrasy, and instability, we need data with several
features. Repeated measurements on the same respondents
must be taken in order to distinguish stable preferences from
response instability. Questions on a range of political issues
must be asked in order to assess whether preferences are
ideologically structured. Anchored response scales are de-
sirable in order to limit measurement error associated with
differential scale use, both across respondents and within
respondents across repeated measurements.
Fortunately, data satisfying all of these criteria are pro-
vided by Broockman (2016). Broockman surveyed US cit-
izens in early January and again in late February 2014. He
asked eight questions as part of a political knowledge bat-
tery and 13 ordinal questions on particular policies. The
questions covered both economic issues (health care, taxes,
Medicare, unions, education, social security) and social/
cultural issues (gun control, immigration, abortion, the en-
vironment, gay rights, afﬁrmative action, and contraception).
The responses to the ordinal policy questions were constructed
so that the middle option represented the status quo, and the
next least extreme response options captured the median
position of the Democratic and Republican parties respec-
tively. Remaining options represented more extreme posi-
tions.2 Giving such speciﬁc response options mitigates the
risk that variation in manifest survey responses will result
from the way respondents use response scales rather than
from respondents’ varying underlying preferences.
Although we focus on the policy questions, we also use
Broockman’s latent trait measure of political knowledge.
Correct or incorrect answers to eight knowledge questions
were aggregated, allowing for variation in question difﬁculty
and the ability of each question to discriminate between
respondents with otherwise similar levels of knowledge. For
simplicity, we categorize respondents as “high” or “low”
political knowledge, using the median political knowledge
score as the cutoff. A total of 1,137 respondents participated
in the ﬁrst wave, of whom 513 also participated in the second
wave. Average levels of political knowledge were modestly
2. Response options were ordered from left- to right-wing for some
questions and right- to left-wing for others.
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(0.15 SD) higher among wave 2 respondents than among
respondents who only responded to wave 1.
METHOD
Decomposing variation in ordinal response data requires us
to make some scaling and modeling assumptions. We as-
sume an ordinal probit response model, where respondents
have latent continuous responses (Y*) that map on to man-
ifest categorical responses (Y) according to cutpoints, which
are drawn from a uniform prior subject to the ordering con-
straint. Our model for the latent response takes the form:
Y＊ijt p bjvi 1 nij 1 εijt;
where i indexes respondents, j indexes questions, t indexes
the survey wave (t p 1, 2), and the parameters in the model
are drawn vi ∼ N(0; 1), nij ∼ N(0;q2j ), and εijt ∼ N(0; j2j ).
The ﬁrst term in the model (bjvi) is the ideological com-
ponent, operationalized as a unidimensional spatial model
where bj describes how the respondent’s latent ideal point v
predicts her latent response on issue j. The signs of v and b
are both arbitrary and unimportant for the variance decom-
position. The second term in the model (nij) is a respondent-
by-issue random effect. This term captures idiosyncratic vari-
ation in preferences that is not attributable to ideology but
that is nonetheless stable across repeat measurements in dif-
ferent time periods t. The third term in the model (εijt) is an
error term capturing instability, variation in an individuals’
manifest responses across repeated measurements. This in-
stability could include response changes from several hy-
pothesized mechanisms, including instability as sheer error
(Achen 1975), as sampling from top-of-the-head consider-
ations (Zaller andFeldman1992), as “ﬂippingacoin” (Converse
1964), or as “real” opinion change in the brief time between
survey waves (which we discuss further in the conclusion).
We are not interested in the sign or magnitude of these
terms for any individual respondent but rather in their
variance per survey item across respondents. In the case of
the respondent-by-issue random effect and the error term,
we use q2j and j
2
j to refer to these variances. The variance of
the ideological component is b2j , which follows from the
identity Var(cx)p c2Var(x) and the fact that vi ∼ N(0; 1).
Because these sources of variation are independent by
assumption, the total variance per survey item can be ex-
pressed as^j p b2j 1 q
2
j 1 j
2
j . The share of the total variance
attributable to ideology can therefore be expressed as b2j =^j;
the share attributable to idiosyncrasy, as q2j =^j; and that at-
tributable to instability, j2j =^j. This three-way decomposition
of latent scale variance is similar in spirit to theMcKelvey and
Zavoina (1975) pseudo-R2 statistic for the ordinal probit re-
gression model, which estimates the R2 that would be re-
covered via linear regression on the unobserved latent vari-
able.
The priors for bj, qj, and jj are standard normal, half nor-
mal, and half normal, respectively. These priors are chosen so
that the prior over the decomposition (b2j =^j, q
2
j =^j, j
2
j =^j)
for each issue j is a symmetric Dirichlet distribution with
parameters equal to 1/2, which is Jeffrey’s noninformative
prior.3 These priors correspond to a weak prior expectation
for an equal split of the variance among ideology, idiosyn-
crasy, and instability, and any deviation from this in our
results reﬂects evidence from the data. The model was esti-
mated using Stan 2.16.2 (Carpenter et al. 2017).
RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the estimated composition of opinion var-
iation for each issue in the data set that we examine. Av-
eraging across issues, we estimate that the fraction of var-
iation accounted for by ideology is low (14%; 95% conﬁdence
interval, 11%–17%) when compared to that explained by
idiosyncrasy (42%; 95% conﬁdence interval, 38%–45%) or
instability (45%; 95% conﬁdence interval, 41%–48%). Most
of the stable preference variation across individuals and
issues is not organized along a single political dimension.
The four most ideological issues are those related to the
size of government: Medicare, taxes, social security, and
health. However, the four issues with the most stable pref-
erences are mostly different issues: immigration, marijuana,
gay rights, and health. This highlights the distinction between
citizens having stable preferences on issues and having ideo-
logical preferences. Respondents to this study have real and
measurable views aboutmarijuana and immigration (relatively
low instability), but those views are almost entirely unpre-
dictable on the basis of a unidimensional summary of their
other positions. Stated preferences regarding unions (and to a
lesser extent education and the environment) are both lacking
in ideological structure and highly unstable; these are the issues
on which the most respondents seem to lack real preferences.
We have conducted a large number of robustness checks
on variant forms of the model and data set (a full tabulation
of these is provided in an appendix, available online). When
we simulate data from the estimates and data-generating
process of the model and reﬁt the model, we recover the
estimated parameter values and decomposition almost ex-
actly, so there is negligible estimator bias. If we omit the
spatial term and decompose preference variation into only
3. If bj, qj, and jj have prior distributions that are standard (half)
normal, their squares are distributed x21, which is equivalent to G(1=2; 2).
The simplex constructed by dividing three G(1=2; 2) random variables by
their sum is distributed D(1/2, 1/2, 1/2).
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idiosyncrasy and instability, we get nearly identical estimates
for instability, and the estimates of idiosyncrasy absorb the
variation associated with ideology in the full model. If we
omit the idiosyncrasy term instead, the share estimated for
ideology absorbs some of the stable variation, increasing
from 14% to 18%.
If we analyze only the ﬁrst wave of data, we get nearly the
same estimate for the share of variation associated with
ideology, but we can no longer distinguish between idio-
syncrasy and instability. For comparison purposes, this one-
wave model can also be applied to Broockman’s accompa-
nying survey of state legislators. Averaging across the policy
issues about which both state legislators and citizens were
asked, we estimate that ideology accounts for 55% of the var-
iation among state legislators, versus 15% for citizens. This
contrast illustrates that it is possible to estimate high shares
of variation for ideology under this approach, as well as to
quantify the well-known, very large difference between the
degree of spatial structure in the positions of elites and citizens.
Adding a second spatial dimension to the ideological
component of the model increases the fraction of variation
explained by ideology from 14% to 24% (95%; conﬁdence
interval, 21%–28%), while leaving that due to instability un-
changed. The fact that adding a second dimension nearly
doubles the variance explained by ideology reinforces the point
that a modest fraction of the variation in public opinion is
captured by a single dimension, despite a two-party system
that one might expect to organize opinion unidimensionally.
Our estimates are somewhat sensitive to collapsing the
extreme policy categories, with the ideology component
rising to 16% when we collapse the two most extreme cate-
gories on each side to generate ﬁve-point scales and 20%
when we collapse all categories on each side of the central
status quo category to generate three-point scales. The in-
crease in the ideology component is entirely at the expense
of the inconsistency component, indicating that there is
more structure and stability in the direction of change that
respondents would like than in exactly how far they would
like policy to move. Finally, we have analyzed a version of the
model where vi is allowed to change at the individual level
between the two periods as an alternative to the unstructured
change captured by the instability term, but we see very little
evidence of ideologically coherent movement between these
two survey waves.
Previous research has suggested that individuals fall into
different groups that exhibit different levels of opinion sta-
Figure 1. Ternary plot showing the composition of the variance for each issue. Medicare is the most ideological issue, immigration is the most idiosyncratic,
unions is the most unstable.
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bility (Hill 2001; Hill and Kriesi 2001) and opinion structure.
Figure 2 shows that, when we split the sample into low- and
high-knowledge individuals, and allow for different ideo-
logical dimensions in each half of the sample, we ﬁnd that
high-knowledge individuals have more ideologically struc-
tured preferences on all but two issues and have less response
instability on all issues. Averaging across issues, ideological
structure explains 23% of variation among high-knowledge
respondents versus 12% among low-knowledge respon-
dents, with a 95% posterior interval for the difference run-
ning from 6% to 16%. Response instability accounts for 38%
of response variation among high-knowledge respondents
versus 51% among low-knowledge respondents, with a 95%
posterior interval for the difference running from 219% to
28%. The single ideological dimensions that best predict
responses among low- and high-knowledge respondents are
different: among low-knowledge respondents, attitudes on
guns and unions most strongly predict other issue prefer-
ences, whereas they are among the least predictive among
high-knowledge respondents.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
These estimates will not come as a great shock to public
opinion researchers. As we noted at the outset, the ideas that
citizens do not organize their views as strongly as political
parties and elites and are sometimes unstable in the pref-
erences they express are hardly novel. The value of this ar-
ticle is in providing a quantitative decomposition: howmuch
of the preference variation we see is due to each of these
factors? On average, in a particular survey instrument que-
rying a particular set of issues at a particular moment in US
history, about 1/7 of cross-sectional variation reﬂects a
common ideological dimension of variation, 3/7 is real but
idiosyncratic variation in individuals’ views, and 3/7 is re-
sponse instability.
The substantial variation across political issues in the de-
gree to which citizens have “real preferences” (either ideolog-
ical or idiosyncratic), plus the further variation in the extent
to which those preferences are ideological rather than idio-
syncratic, indicates that our results might change substan-
tially with a different sample of issues. Our results might also
change with different response categories or different word-
ings of those response categories—we note Broockman’s own
cautionary remarks regarding the choice of policy options
(2016, 187)—but we have no reason to believe that differ-
ently worded response options would affect our results in
any particular direction. The issues chosen include a variety
of types (some primarily economic, some primarily socio-
cultural), and all of the issues are sufﬁciently prominent for
researchers to be able to identify thepreferredpositions of elite
actors (Broockman 2016). If lower proﬁle issues were chosen
instead, we would expect the estimated ideological and idio-
syncratic shares of the decomposition to decline and instability
to increase.
The variation we observe by political knowledge level
suggests that the results might also vary in a more repre-
sentative sample. Those who responded to the second survey
wave had somewhat higher levels of knowledge than those
who only responded to the ﬁrst wave. This suggests that our
ﬁndings, if anything, overestimate the portion of variation
Figure 2. Difference in the percentage of opinion variation explained by ideology and idiosyncrasy for high-knowledge respondents versus low-knowledge
respondents.
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accounted for by ideology and underestimate the portion of
variation accounted for by instability.
In addition to the ways that our estimates are context de-
pendent because of the structure of the survey data we work
with, they are also model dependent because of the way we
structure the analysis. While the model we specify enables an
elegant variance decomposition, it makes certain functional
form assumptions in order to enable that decomposition.
While we think these are fairly innocuous with respect to the
general conclusions, the exact estimates would surely change
under a different approach to decomposition. Because the data
we work with have only two waves, we also cannot distinguish
instability from real opinion change, which is a fourth po-
tential source of variation in response, albeit one that is only
likely to be more important over timescales longer than six
weeks. The framework described above can be easily ex-
tended to perform a four-way decomposition given addi-
tional survey waves. The key to doing so is the logic used by
Converse (1964): if opinion change is real, opinions in ad-
jacent waves will be more similar than those in nonadjacent
waves. In the context of our model, this would most natu-
rally take the form of a normally distributed random-walk
process, for each respondent, for each item. We have also set
aside possible opinion processes that would fundamentally
undermine the logic of this sort of decomposition, such as the
possibility that opinion on one issue might predict changes in
opinion on other issues across waves (dynamic constraint).
In sum, our ﬁndings put quantitative ﬁgures behind the
argument made by Broockman (2016) that real idiosyncratic
preference variation is much greater than real ideological
preference variation among the US public. This is important
not only for adjudicating between theories of public opinion
but also because of the widespread use of unidimensional
models, both formal and informal, to understand interactions
between elites and the public. The fact that roughly 3/4 of real
public opinion variation does not reﬂect a unidimensional
spatial dimension, and the fact that a second spatial dimension
is nearly as powerful as the ﬁrst, does not necessarily under-
mine the use of such models. There is, by construction, always
a single dimension that captures more opinion variation than
any other, and positions on that dimension will therefore al-
ways be important to electoral interactions. However, con-
clusions drawn from models focusing exclusively on a single
dimension may or may not be robust to the fact that this di-
mension captures only a small proportion of the real opinion
variation on which basis citizens may make choices and to
which elites may have opportunities to respond.
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